في كتابه “كرامة التشريع” (بالإنجليزية) يشير جيريمي والدرون – وهو حاليا من أهم فلاسفة القانون ويدرس في جامعة اكسفورد وجامعة نيويورك – بأن هناك أهمية خاصة لدى جون لوك للتشريع من خلال “جمعية” تمثيلية للمجتمع وإن كان التشريع ممكن من حيث المبدأ من قبل شخص واحد. وهذا مرتبط بأننا نختلف حول مفهوم العدالة، الحقوق، المصلحة العامة، والقانون الطبيعي. وبالتالي فإن عملية التشريع من خلال جمعية (نسميها برلمان أو مجلس نواب أو مجلس تشريعي)، وبعكس التشريع من قبل شخص واحد، يكون حصيلة نقاش بين رؤى مختلفة والوصول إلى حلول وسط تعكس هذا الخلاف وهو ما يميز الوحدة المدنية عن غيرها من التجمعات الممكنة للبشر.

In theory they may be resolved by a monarch or a junta, and the members of the junta may even wear wigs and gowns; in theory the ultimate legislative power may be vested in one person or a few. But in practice that will usually be unwise. What is important is that the institution which, by virtue of its representative character, embodies our “mutual Influence, Sympathy, and Connexion” (II: 212), should also be the one which determines – using something like majority• voting – our disagreements about justice, rights, the common good, and natural law. The institution which comprises our representatives and the institution which resolves our ultimate differences in moral principle ought to be one and the same. It is by combining these functions that it embodies our civic unity and our sense of mutual sympathy. “This,” as Locke says, “is the Soul that gives Form, Life, and Unity to the Commonwealth” (II: 212). (Waldron, 1999, pp. 86-87)

There are many of us, and we disagree about justice. How we think about such disagreement will determine how we think about politics. And since law is the offspring of politics, how we think about disagreement will determine in some measure how we think about positive law.

(Waldron 1999, 36)

“Understood in this way, the Rule of Law is not simply the principle that officials and citizens should apply and obey the law even when it disserves their own interests. It is the principle that an official or citizen should do this even when the law is – in their confident opinion – unjust, morally wrong, or misguided as a matter of policy.” (Waldron, 1999, p. 37)

Hannah Arendt describing Immanuel Kant’s declining years: “the decrease of his mental faculties, which finally led to senile imbecility, is a matter of fact.” (!!!!!!) Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 9. Cited in: (Waldron 1999, p. 42)

“Even if we are angels, we are opinionated angels, and we hold conflicting views about right which we are prepared to fight for.” (Waldron, 1999, p. 46)

“[T]here is no state of nature: it’s just an idea of reason.” (Waldron, 1999, p. 60)

كرامة التشريع هي في التعددية – والتعددية هي أساس الدولة (بحسب أرسطو) (ترجمة بتصرف):

إن طبيعة الدول هي في التعددية… الدولة لا تتشكل من مجموع (أشخاص) فحسب وإنما بتجمع (أشخاص) مختلفين – لأن (الأشخاص) المتشابهين لا يمكنهم أن يشكلوا دولة.

“(T]he nature of a state is to be a plurality … [A] state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. (Waldron 1999, 118)

But the obvious is our business; making sense (or nonsense) of the obvious is what philosophers do! (Waldron 1999, 126)